The Battle of the Palo River () was a battle of the Colombian War of Independence, fought on July 5, 1815, in which the army of the southern United Provinces of New Granada defeated the Spanish Royalist army of Quito.
After the failure of Antonio Nariño's southern campaign in 1814, the remnants of the independence forces withdrew to Popayán under the command of colonel José María Cabal. The victorious royalists, now under Lieutenant Colonel Aparicio Vidaurrázaga, went on a counter offensive in late December 1814, capturing the city of Popayán on December 29, 1814. They looked to invade the Cauca Valley, where the independence forces had retreated, and if successful, reconquer the rest of New Granada. Cabal, now brigadier general, placed the majority of his forces in a foritifed position on the northern bank of the Palo River, planning to lead the royalist forces there. The battle occurred after a series of retreating skirmishes broke out between the independence forces and the royalist army in June 1815. The royalists appeared on the south bank of the Palo river on July 4, and began their assault in the early morning hours of July 5.
The battle was a decisive victory for the independence forces and one of the most important battles of the Colombian War of Independence. The victory at Palo River allowed the republicans to recapture Popayán and push the royalists back to Pasto. For the next year, the Cauca province of New Granada was free of Spanish Royalist presence. This lasted until June 1816, when the royalists conducted an offensive in tandem with Pablo Morillo's expeditionary army from Spain coming from the north.Riaño, C. (1967) «La batalla del río Palo», Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, (45), pp. 361–391. doi: 10.25062/0120-0631.2912.
Prelude With the failure of Nariño's southern campaign in 1814 after the patriot defeat at the Battle of Ejidos de Pasto, the remnants of the patriot army who were at the gates of Pasto were forced to retreat back to Popayán, and shortly after fell back towards the Cauca Valley. With the patriots in retreat, and the return of King Ferdinand VII to the throne in Spain the situation seemed favorable for a royalist offensive; thus, Toribio Montes, Captain general and Governor of Quito, began plans for an offensive to reconquer the Viceroyalty of New Granada. Montes’s first decision would be the removal of Field Marshall Aymerich from his post as commander of the army and governor of Popayán, as their relationship had become strained during Nariño’s campaign. Montes replaced him with Lieutenant Colonel Aparicio de Vidaurrazaga. On December 6, 1814, Vidaurrazaga departed with the army from Pasto and captured Popayán on December 29 with 550 men. Upon arrival at Popayán, he requested more troops from Montes and dispatched units to the north of Popayán.
Meanwhile the patriot army, the army of the south, had retreated north to the Cauca Valley. During the coming months the army would undergo an intense reorganization process as well as training troops with an emphasis on physical fitness, which consisted of long marches at double time for 2 hours each day starting at 5 am. Cabal also decided to do away with Spanish manual of arms and adopted the French one which was translated by Captain Liborio Mejia. The republican government approved of these methods and as such promoted the commander of the army José María Cabal from colonel to brigadier general,Riaño, C. (1967) «La batalla del río Palo», Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, (45), pp. 364. doi: 10.25062/0120-0631.2912. however despite these efforts’ problems such as desertion remained a serious problem for the patriots. By 1815 Cabal’s army had some 1,200 troops composed of 5 infantry battalions:
Cundinamarca Battalion Socorro Battalion Cauca Battalion Antioquia Battalion Popayan Battalion
160 troops were cavalry, composed of the Veteran squadron and the Buga volunteer’s squadron. The army also had at its disposition two 4-pounder cannons and two falconet light cannons.Riaño, C. (1967) «La batalla del río Palo», Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, (45), pp. 365. doi: 10.25062/0120-0631.2912. The republican government also dispatched 3 distinguished officers to assist Cabal, those being the Quiteño Colonel Carlos de Montúfar and French Colonel Manuel Roergas de Serviez and French cavalry captain Honorato Dufour. The arrival of Dofour was a welcome addition, as he was considered the best cavalry officer in the army, meanwhile Serviez's arrival was less so, although Cabal recognized that he was an extremely competent and disciplined officer, he was hard to work with and arrogant.
Battle Vidaurrázaga wanting to continue his offensive requested permission from Montes in Quito and subsequently received his approval to commence operations. Prior to setting out, he received a letter with confidential orders from Montes that instructed him to "give no quarter to the enemy."
With everything order Vidauarrázaga then deployed his vanguard, under the command of Captain Mariano Cucalón, who had with him 616 troops along with two artillery pieces. The vanguard set out and soon occupied the town Piendamó and its surroundings to the north, and then took the town of Tunia, eventually reaching the vicinity of Ovejas, where there was an advanced position of Patriot troops.
The Spanish rearguard, composed of 400 men, and armed with two 4-pounder cannons, began their march on June 21 with Vidaurrázaga himself leaving Popayán on the 24th.
The Royalist plan was to march to the Cauca Valley, meanwhile Lieutenant Colonel Delgado and the Lieutenant Governors of Iscuandé and Micay, Illera and Valverde, would march on the patriot troops of Dagua to take the rest of the province, and attract the attention of the Army of the South and thus make rapid progress in their offensive.
At Ovejas the patriots had placed an advance force composed of 300 troops of the Socorro and Antioquia battalion, there they engaged the royalists for 2 hours but eventually withdrew.Andrade A. Alberto (1973) José María Cabal: Prócer de la Independencia. Imprenta y Litografía de las Fuerzas Militares. Bogotá. p. 187. Cabal had devised a plan if the royalists attacked Ovejas, it consisted of consecutive defensive lines that were meant to slow down his enemy and cause as much damage as possible and then lead them to a fortified position near the Palo River north of the town of Caloto. Vidaurrázaga upon seeing the patriots retreat and not knowing of their defense plan, thought their retreat meant he had defeated them and he pressed his advance.
At the Palo river the patriot forces had organized their position on the battlefield as follows: Advanced units were placed on the right bank of the river, then, at a short distance, a line of fortifications defended by troops and further back the battlefield, a plain, in which they had to form the battalions to face the enemy.
The Popayán battalion defended with 83 troops the most western steps, called Pilamus. On the day of the battle, the outposts were made up of the battalions, Popayán, on the left and Cazadores del Cauca, on the right, which were supported by 80 cavalry. Probably, outside of the artillery that participated in the battle, there were some other pieces in the fortifications because at midnight between the nights of July 4 to 5 a 4-pounder cannon arrived at the Palo field.
The patriot camp was organized in the same order in which the patriots had been training for combat, with the Cundinamarca battalion on the left, Socorro in the center, and Antioquía on the right flank.
The royalists arrived near the Patriot positions on July 4 and camped on the left bank of the Palo river, they then conducted a detailed reconnaissance survey of the Patriot positions. Vidaurrázaga then sent 2 scouts down river to look for a crossing where the entire army could cross and attack the Patriots while also avoiding their fortifications, they reported back to their commander that they had found one near a trail called Platanal which traversed through a small mountain, led to a ford of the river that allowed for a crossing with very little risk.
With this information Vidaurrázaga convened a meeting with his officers on the night of July 4 to plan their strategy. This strategy would consist of the placing the 4th company of Patía in front of the enemy to grab their attention while the royalist vanguard and rearguard divisions would conduct a left flanking movement.
As the royalists were planning their attack, so too were their patriot counterparts, Cabal convened a meeting with all of his officers. Colonel Serviez suggested moving the troops more towards the west, however Cabal disregarded this suggestion considering that the current area was favorable to the Patriot army with most of the other officers in agreement.
Commencement of the battle The battle began around 5 am on July 5, when a column of royalist troops crossed the Palo river through a ford that lay west of the main crossing known as the Paso Real to avoid patriot defenses and attack their right flank. This caught the patriots by surprise, as they had not expected to be attacked on their right. At the same time, the royalists were also able to get across around 200 infantry and 150 horses through the main Paso Real which lay on the patriot's left flank and began combat with the Patriot outpost unit which was the Popayán battalion commanded by Captain Pedro Murgueitio who then alerted the other patriot units of the attack.Andrade A. Alberto (1973) José María Cabal: Prócer de la Independencia. Imprenta y Litografía de las Fuerzas Militares. Bogotá. p. 191. The Popayán battalion positioned in some trenches maintained heavy fire over the royalists, buying time for the rest of the army to form up. After some time the Popayán battalion then subsequently withdrew to the main defense line where the Cundinamarca battalion was located allowing the royalists to cross the river. The rest of the patriot force, who had been waiting for the attack upon knowing where the main attack would occur took formation through drum commands. The royalists launched their attacks in a disorderly fashion while the patriots fought back while withdrawing to their main lines in an orderly and disciplined fashion. The Spanish continued advancing up until they reached musket range. On the patriot left flank, a Patriot cavalry squadron under the command of Captain Manuel José Solís attacked the advancing royalist troops, the charge was valiant however it was defeated and Captain Solís was killed near a Spanish cannon.
General Cabal directly commanded the battle. Cabal considered more favorable for the result, that the right wing retreat to the height, where the supply barracks were located, he ordered his assistant to communicate this instruction to the Quarter master. And as he saw that Serviez had arranged for Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Monsalve to advance to the left of the right wing with 50 men from the Cauca battalion, added to his battalion, for the withdrawal of the advanced posts, in such a way that the unit was between the enemy fires and those of his own artillery, ordered the immediate withdrawal of this battalion, The Royalist Commander, who was misinformed about the character of the enemy troops, was surprised when he saw the patriot units movements and discipline of their formations. He even praised them, writing after the battle that: “The opponents wait, make their fires and withdraw from ours, at the time I observed that five enemy columns were formed that made up greater forces than had been considered at all times”