A constitutional referendum was held in Brazil on 6 January 1963 to determine the country's form of government (parliamentarism or presidentialism). Voters were asked whether they approved of a constitutional amendment made in 1961 that transferred much of the president's power to the National Congress. The changes were rejected by the majority of voters, resulting in the choice of presidentialism, the end of the Parliamentary Republic established in 1961 and the restoration of the full powers of president João Goulart, also sworn in in 1961. The referendum's original date was April 1965, but it was brought forward.
Goulart's inauguration had been the target of an attempt at a military veto and it was only possible due to a political compromise that resulted in the adoption of parliamentarism to weaken his powers. However, as soon as he took power, he sought to bring forward the plebiscite provided for by law and restore presidentialism. A broad front wanted the end of the still little consolidated parliamentary experience, even without necessarily supporting the president. Thus, state governors, presidential candidates, trade unionists, the military and others defended the anti-parliamentary cause.
In 1962, political crises in July and September, both with general strikes and military pressure, allowed the president to obtain a favorable prime minister and intimidate Congress to bring forward the voting date. Goulart then received funding from businessmen for a strong election campaign, while the parliamentary cause had little support. The result at the polls was overwhelming in favor of presidentialism.
The anti-parliamentary effort was the priority of the Goulart government in its first year, being related to the short duration of parliamentary cabinets, the deepening of the national economic crisis, the strengthening of trade unionism (with the founding of the General Command of Workers) and the deterioration of relations with the United States.
Terminology In Brazilian terminology, a plebiscite is held before the legal or administrative act in question, while a referendum is held after it. Parliamentarism was instituted in 1961, with the act that instituted it providing for a "plebiscite" to be held on the matter, but the law that brought it forward called it a "referendum".
Background
On 24 August 1961, then president Jânio Quadros resigned, seeking to trigger a succession crisis against the inauguration of his vice-president João Goulart, who was on a trip to China. Through the high military command, Quadros intended to receive extraordinary powers from Congress to govern; however, his resignation was accepted by Congress and he could not regain the presidency, but a crisis ensued: the military ministers did not accept the presidential line of succession and vetoed Goulart's inauguration, while Leonel Brizola, governor of Rio Grande do Sul, rejected the veto of the military ministers. The Brazilian Army was not united on the matter, as the 3rd Army (from the South) of general Machado Lopes joined the cause of Goulart's inauguration. The possibility of civil war arose, but "following an old national tradition" the solution was a compromise, preserving the president's mandate but weakening his powers through the adoption of parliamentarism.
Constitutional Amendment No. 4 to the 1946 Constitution, also called the "Additional Act", implemented parliamentarism as a form of government, later regulated by Complementary Law No. 1 of 17 July 1962. The legislation provided for pure parliamentarism, with a weak president elected by Congress and power concentrated in the Council of Ministers, whose president was equivalent to a prime minister. However, Goulart's term, still elected by popular suffrage in the previous system in 1960, would be a transitional period with a hybrid character. The law still gave political influence to the president, using ambiguous writing, and the hybridity manifested itself in the actual functioning of the system. Goulart still had prestige, the Legislature did not use its new prerogatives, and the system had little written institutionalization and no tradition. The relationship between the branches of government had little real change and the cabinets functioned as presidential ministries.
The new system had weaknesses from the start. It was discussed in a hurry and approved with a confusing text, removing powers from the president of the Republic in the full term of office. It was opposed by the political class from the beginning and had low popular acceptance. The measure had an ideological nature and irritated the left, for which it was a "white coup". Its permanence was not decided, since it was stated in the Additional Act:
Goulart's ambitions and implications
Goulart's term would end on 31 January 1966, so the plebiscite was scheduled for April 1965. Since taking office, Goulart articulated the reversion to presidentialism, and at the opening of the 1962 legislative works he explained his intention to regain his powers with an early plebiscite. The dispute for bringing the referendum forward, driven by trade unionism, military and political pressure, was then won in September by an anti-parliamentary coalition stronger than the parliamentary one — even Goulart's enemies wanted presidentialism. Opposing forces, such as military ministers and trade unions, participated in this broad front. The country went through two crises. The first, in July 1962, led to the inauguration of a prime minister subservient to the presidential agenda, and the second, in September, to the reschedule of the plebiscite.
In order restore presidentialism, Goulart needed to demonstrate fidelity to the legal order and enlist support to pressure Congress. Cabinet instability and inflation marked the beginning of his government. In his first year in power, he concentrated his forces on bringing forward the plebiscite, and thus had no interest in strengthening the parliamentary regime or in stabilizing the economy through an unpopular fiscal adjustment. There were difficulties in applying economic policy from the dismissal of Tancredo Neves, in June, to the reschedule vote in September; instability made any stabilization program unfeasible in mid-1962. Monetary and fiscal aggregates were out of control during this period, especially in the crises of July and September. Thus, Brazil was not in a position to satisfy the demands of the John F. Kennedy government in the United States, which was willing to negotiate financial assistance if the Brazilian government fought inflation and distanced itself from the left. In the 1962 congressional elections, the opposition received American funding.
The U.S. Embassy was concerned about the use of the radical left in the unions to support the early referendum. During this period, syndicalism strengthened its organization and even proved capable of acting against Goulart's wishes, although it did not have an "independent historical action". This strengthening later diminished the government's freedom to determine its economic policy, making it difficult to implement the Triennial Plan in 1962. At the same time, the president's political tactics strained his relationship with the business sector.
Some analysts attributed the success of the strikes to the protection provided by nationalist officers against state police repression. This support is confirmed by the sources in the case of general Osvino Ferreira Alves' 1st Army, but not in others, and yet the nationalist officers did not approve of the strikes. But for Goulart, military support was crucial and was achieved by placing nationalist officers in key commands as part of the nominations and promotions policy. At the very least, the neutrality of the Armed Forces was necessary so that popular pressure applied to Congress did not serve as a pretext for a coup d'état.
Dispute to bring forward the plebiscite
Opinion of the political class The National Democratic Union (UDN) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) voted in favor of the parliamentary amendment, while the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), Goulart's party, was against it. However, even in 1961 some members of the UDN and PSD were already conferring with the military for the return of presidentialism. For parliamentarians, there were reasons to oppose the consolidation of parliamentarism, as it would lead to the centralization of legislative activity in parties, to the detriment of individual parliamentarians, and the delegation of powers to the cabinet to the detriment of the parliament.
On the other hand, the PSD benefited from parliamentarism by being the largest party in Congress, and the UDN by weakening its enemy Goulart. For political scientist Argelina Figueiredo, UDN and PSD congressmen were mostly against parliamentarism, but a contrary argument is that, if this was the case, it would not have been necessary to apply so much pressure to bring forward the plebiscite. Goulart defeated offensives in Congress to consolidate parliamentarism, first in an attempt to pass a complementary law in September 1961, and then in administrative decrees that would strengthen the Council of Ministers.
The presidential candidates in the 1965 election, such as Juracy Magalhães (UDN), Juscelino Kubitschek (PSD) and Magalhães Pinto (UDN), wanted to get rid of parliamentarism as soon as possible. Leonel Brizola (PTB), possibly interested in running in 1965, wanted Goulart to use full presidential powers in favor of his base on the left. Magalhães was conservative, but he was part of the anti-parliamentary front on the left. Carlos Lacerda, from Magalhães party and also running for president, wanted to reverse parliamentary rule and is mentioned among its opponents, but he acted against the referendum.
In turn, state governors, among whom were Carlos Lacerda (from Guanabara) and Magalhães Pinto (from Minas Gerais), were unwilling to comply with Article 24 of the Additional Act, which provided for the extension of parliamentarism to the states of the federation. On 8 June, the governors met in Araxá, with the exception of Lacerda, and agreed to support the initiative to bring forward the plebiscite, on the initiative of Magalhães Pinto.
July strike and inauguration of Brochado da Rocha The Tancredo Neves cabinet resigned in June 1962 in order to participate in the October congressional elections. This noncompliance was a presidential legal requirement and a proposed elimination was defeated in the Senate. Tancredo Neves was not dedicated to the preservation of parliamentarism, but his fall was the "beginning of the end" of the regime, as his cabinet, unlike the others that followed, was not formed with the commitment to bring forward the plebiscite and was not dependent on Goulart.
The president then maneuvered to discredit parliamentarism. On 27 June, he appointed San Tiago Dantas to succeed Tancredo; Dantas was known for the Independent Foreign Policy and was rejected by the right. After Dantas appointment was blocked by the UDN and PSD, Goulart appointed Auro de Moura Andrade, from the PSD's conservative wing, on the condition that he keep an undated resignation letter. Andrade was approved by Congress, but unionists called a general strike on 5 July to change the cabinet. On 4 July, the resignation letter was used to eliminate Andrade. With the impasse created by the nomination of Andrade and the attrition of two failed appointments, Congress accepted the nomination of Brochado da Rocha (PSD) on 10 July. Rocha was an inexpressive name, subordinate to the president and committed to presidentialism.